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THE SPECTER OF THE GIANT THREE
LUCIAN BEBCHUK* & SCOTT HIRST**

ABSTRACT
This Article examines the large, steady, and continuing growth of the Big
Three index fund managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global
Advisors. We show that there is a real prospect that index funds will continue to
grow, and that voting in most significant public companies will come to be
dominated by the future “Giant Three.”
We begin by analyzing the drivers of the rise of the Big Three, including the
structural factors that are leading to the heavy concentration of the index funds
sector. We then provide empirical evidence about the past growth and current
status of the Big Three, and their likely growth into the Giant Three. Among
other things, we document that the Big Three have almost quadrupled their
collective ownership stake in S&P 500 companies over the past two decades;
that they have captured the overwhelming majority of the inflows into the asset
management industry over the past decade, that each of them now manages 5%
or more of the shares in a vast number of public companies; and that they
collectively cast an average of about 25% of the votes at S&P 500 companies.
We then extrapolate from past trends to estimate the future growth of the Big
Three. We estimate that the Big Three could well cast as much as 40% of the
votes in S&P 500 companies within two decades. Policymakers and others must
recognize—and must take seriously—the prospect of a Giant Three scenario.
The plausibility of this scenario exacerbates concerns about the problems with
index fund incentives that we identify and document in other work.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the steady rise of the “Big Three” index fund
managers—Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors (“SSGA”).
Based our analysis of recent trends, we conclude that the Big Three will likely
continue to grow into a “Giant Three,” and that the Giant Three will likely come
to dominate voting in public companies. This Giant Three scenario raises the
importance of the problems with index fund incentives in general, and the Big
Three in particular, that we analyze and document in other work.1
Our analysis is divided into three parts. In Part I, we analyze three key drivers
that underlie the steady and persistent growth of the Big Three, and which mean
that this growth is likely to continue. First, we discuss the factors that have led
to the tenfold increase in institutional investor ownership over the past six
decades. Second, we document the steady growth of the proportion of the assets
managed by investment managers that are allocated to index funds. Third, we
analyze three factors that lead to the heavy concentration of the index fund
sector: scale economies, the liquidity benefits offered by exchange-traded funds
(“ETFs”) with large assets, and the ability of dominant index fund managers to
compete quickly with new products introduced by rivals. These factors are likely
to facilitate the continued dominance of the Big Three.
In Part II, we present our empirical analysis of the past growth of the Big
Three, their current status as major shareholders of U.S. companies, and their
likely future growth. Our empirical analysis focuses on the companies in the
S&P 500 and Russell 3000 indices, which represent 73% and 91% (respectively)
of the total market capitalization of listed U.S. companies as of December 31,
2017.2
We start with the past growth and current status of the Big Three. Among
other things, we document that:
• Over the last decade, more than 80% of all assets flowing into
investment funds has gone to the Big Three, and the proportion of
total funds flowing to the Big Three has been rising through the
second half of the decade;

1

See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 95 (2017); Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index
Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, COLUM. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3282794.
2
Calculated based on market capitalization data from the Center for Research in Securities
Prices. Market capitalization data is based on those types of shares included in the Russell
3000 and S&P 500, including common shares of U.S. companies, non-U.S. companies, real
estate investment trusts, shares of beneficial interest, and units of companies incorporated
outside the United States.
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•

The average combined stake in S&P 500 companies held by the Big
Three essentially quadrupled over the past two decades, from 5.2%
in 1998 to 20.5% in 2017;3
• Over the past decade, the number of positions in S&P 500 companies
in which the Big Three hold 5% or more of the company’s equity has
increased more than five-fold, with each of BlackRock and Vanguard
now holding positions of 5% or more of the shares of almost all of
the companies in the S&P 500;
• Following two decades of growth, the Big Three now collectively
hold an average stake of more than 20% of S&P 500 companies;4 and
• Because the Big Three generally vote all of their shares, whereas not
all of the non-Big Three shareholders of those companies do so,
shares held by the Big Three represent an average of about 25% of
the shares voted in director elections at S&P 500 companies in 2018.
Building on this analysis of past growth, we then proceed to extrapolate from
past trends to predict the likely growth of the Big Three in the next two decades.
Assuming that past trends continue, we estimate that the share of votes that the
Big Three would cast at S&P 500 companies could well reach about 34% of
votes in the next decade, and about 41% of votes in two decades. Thus, if recent
trends continue, the Big Three could be expected to become the “Giant Three.”
In this Giant Three scenario, three investment managers would largely dominate
shareholder voting in practically all significant U.S. companies that do not have
a controlling shareholder.
We conclude by observing the substantial policy implications of the specter
of the Giant Three. Here we build on our large-scale study of index fund
stewardship, which analyzes the incentives of index fund managers and provides
comprehensive empirical evidence on their stewardship activities.5 That study
analyzes and documents the incentives of index fund managers, and especially
major fund managers such as the Big Three, to be excessively deferential toward
corporate managers. We argue that recognition of the Giant Three scenario
increases the importance of the agency problems afflicting Big Three incentives
that we have identified. Recognizing the specter of the Giant Three reinforces
the importance of a serious consideration of these problems.
In addition to our own prior work, the work that is most closely related to this
Article is an elegant essay by Professor John Coates.6 Although we and Coates
both focus on issues arising from the growing concentration of ownership in the
3

See infra Figure 1, Panel 1 and accompanying text.
See infra Table 5 and accompanying text.
5
See generally Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1.
6
See generally John C. Coates IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The
Problem of Twelve (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No.
1001, 2019), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Coates_1001.p
df.
4
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hands of a relatively small number of institutional investors, our works and
views differ in key respects. To begin, Coates’s essay focuses on what he labels
“the problem of twelve”—that is, the possibility that twelve management teams
will gain “practical power over the majority of U.S. public companies.”7 By
contrast, we focus on the possibility that a much smaller number of management
teams—the Big Three—will come to dominate ownership in most public
companies. In addition, this Article differs from Coates’s work in that our
empirical analysis focuses on documenting the growth of the Big Three and
estimating its future trajectory.
Finally, our view on the problems with the growing concentration of
ownership substantially differs from that of Coates. Whereas Coates seems to be
concerned that investment managers will excessively use the power that comes
from their large ownership stakes, we have a very different concern—that the
Giant Three will have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate
managers. Our concern is therefore that the substantial proportion of equity
ownership with incentives towards deference will depress shareholder
intervention overall, and result in insufficient checks on corporate managers.
Whatever one’s view of the nature of the Giant Three problem and the
concerns that it raises, the specter of the Giant Three that we document and
analyze represents a major challenge. We hope that our work will highlight for
researchers, market participants, and policymakers the importance of the Giant
Three scenario. The specter of the Giant Three deserves close attention, and our
empirical evidence and framework of analysis could inform any future
consideration of this subject.
I.

THE RISE OF THE GIANT THREE: DRIVERS

This Part analyzes three key drivers that underlie the consistent growth of the
Big Three and make it likely that this growth and the related dominance of the
Big Three will continue. First, the proportion of shares held by institutional
investors has grown considerably and can be expected to continue to grow.
Second, of the shares held by institutional investors, the proportion invested in
index funds has also grown steadily, and can also be expected to continue to
grow. Third, structural factors have led to heavy concentration in the index funds
sector and suggest that the Big Three will only increase their dominance.
Sections I.A through I.C examine in turn each of these three drivers.
A.

The Rise of Institutional Investors

Over the last fifty years, institutional investors have come to hold a majority
of the equity of U.S. public companies.8 From 1950 to 2017, the institutional

7

Coates IV, supra note 6, at 1.
For early works on the rise of institutional investors, see, for example, Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 567 (1990); Robert Charles Clark,
8
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ownership of corporate equity increased tenfold, from 6.1% to 65%.9 As a result,
institutional investors now control a large majority of the shares of public
companies and have a dominant impact on vote outcomes at those companies.
Many observers have viewed the steady increase in the share of stock owned
by institutional investors as being driven by a number of factors.10 Changes in
the regulation of retirement savings increased the aggregate amount of
retirement savings.11 Retirement savings shifted from bank savings accounts to
the public equity markets, as a result of favorable tax changes12 and innovations
in equity investment products.13 An increasing focus on the value of low-cost
diversification in investments was also met by lower-cost options for achieving
such diversification among public equities.14 These factors remain in place, and
have led to continuing increases in the proportion of corporate equity owned by

Comment & Review, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1981); Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism?
Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-Concentration in the United States, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 11,
12 (2008); Donald E. Farrar & Lance Girton, Institutional Investors and Concentration of
Financial Power: Berle and Means Revisited, 36 J. FIN. 369, 375 (1981); Edward B. Rock,
The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J.
445, 447 (1991). For more recent works, see Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 1, at 91;
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 874-75 (2013).
9
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE,
Z1: FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH QUARTER 2017 130 (2018)
(providing evidence of level of ownership in 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/z1/20180308/z1.pdf [https://perma.cc/23K7-63UJ]; MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN
RABIMOV, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND
PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22 (2010), https://www.conference-board.org/publications/pub
licationdetail.cfm?publicationid=1872 (providing evidence of level of ownership in 1950).
10
See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 363, 365 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
11
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 8, at 879-80 (describing effect of Employee
Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 on volume of retirement savings invested in
equity securities).
12
See Clark, supra note 8, at 575; Davis, supra note 8, at 14-15 (“While institutions still
avoid seeking board representation, a few of them have amassed substantial ownership blocks
in hundreds of companies, due in large part to changes in pension financing and tax laws.”).
13
See John V. Duca, The Democratization of America’s Capital Markets, ECON. & FIN.
REV., Second Quarter 2001, at 10, 13 (“Between the mid-1970s and late 1990s, household
portfolios changed greatly as the share of household financial assets in bank deposits fell,
while that in mutual funds and securities jumped from 22 percent in 1975 to 42 percent in
1999.”).
14
See id. at 14-15 (describing causes of declines in asset transaction costs that facilitated
equity ownership by households).
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institutional investors over the last decade. As a result, it is plausible to expect
the increase in institutional ownership to continue.
B.

The Growing Share of Index Funds

In addition to the growth in the proportion of corporate equity held by
institutional investors, there has also been substantial growth in the proportion
of institutional investor assets that are invested in index funds.
Index funds are investment funds: funds that pool the investments of many
individuals and others (which we refer to as “beneficial investors”) and invest
them in diversified portfolios of assets. Investment funds may invest in debt
securities or other assets, but we focus on investment funds that invest in equity
securities. Among those equity investment funds, index funds invest in
portfolios that attempt to track the performance of a particular benchmark stock
market index, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 3000. Index funds can be either
traditional “open-ended” mutual funds or ETFs. A well-known example of an
index mutual fund is the Vanguard S&P 500 Mutual Fund. The two largest index
ETFs are SSGA’s SPDR S&P 500 ETF and BlackRock’s iShares Core S&P 500
ETFs.15
The growth of index funds is commonly attributed to a recognition of their
advantages compared with active funds: lower costs, superior returns after fees,
and tax advantages for investors holding funds in accounts that are not taxsheltered.16 The shift to index funds has been dramatic, with index funds
increasing their share of the total assets invested in equity mutual funds more
than eightfold in two decades, from 4% in 1995 to 34% in 2015.17
Table 1 shows the asset flows to (and from, shown in parentheses) both
actively managed investment funds and index investment funds during the ten
years from 2009 to 2018.18 As Table 1 shows, inflows to index funds have
dominated those to actively managed funds over the past decade. From 2009 to
2018, total inflows to actively managed funds were less than $200 billion, with
significant outflows over the last five years erasing most of the inflows into
actively managed funds over the first five years of that period. In contrast, total
inflows to index funds over the same period were more than $3.4 trillion,
eighteen times the total flows to actively managed funds. Flows to index funds
over that decade were consistently positive and increased over time: the average

15

See infra Table 2.
For recent writings stressing the advantages of index funds over actively managed funds,
see, for example, Gregory Zuckerman, The Passivists: Why Stock Pickers Are Keeping the
Faith, WALL STREET J., Oct. 22, 2016, at B1.
17
John C. Bogle, The Index Mutual Fund: 40 Years of Growth, Change, and Challenge,
72 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 9, 9 (2016).
18
Table 1 is based on asset flow data from Morningstar Direct accessed on December 20,
2018. The 2018 figures include data through November 2018.
16
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inflow from 2014 to 2018 was $476 billion per year, more than double that from
2009 to 2013 ($221.5 billion per year).
The growth in the share of index funds at the expense of active funds has been
partly due to growing levels of investment in ETFs. Because of the way in which
ETFs operate and are regulated, they are largely limited to investment strategies
that track a defined index.19 As Table 1 indicates, the majority of the substantial
growth in index funds has been driven by the growth of ETFs. Flows to index
ETFs outpaced flows to index mutual funds every year from 2009 to 2018, and
the total asset flow to index ETFs from 2009 to 2018 was 60% greater than the
asset flows to index mutual funds over the same period.
Table 1. Asset Flows To (From) Active and Index Funds ($ Billions).
Active Funds

Index Funds

Total

Mutual Funds

ETFs

Total

2009

259.8

62.9

126.5

189.4

449.2

2010

234.5

65.4

127.1

192.5

427.0

2011

27.8

58.4

121.1

179.4

207.2

2012

186.5

80.4

165.4

245.8

432.3

2013

154.1

104.8

195.7

300.4

454.5

Total
(2009-2013)

862.7

371.7

735.8

1,107.5

1,970.2

2014

104.2

148.8

207.6

356.3

460.5

2015

(180.9)

175.8

239.8

415.6

234.6

2016

(344.1)

192.1

261.8

453.9

109.9

2017

(63.9)

237.3

463.7

701.0

637.2

2018

(185.3)

172.1

280.5

452.6

267.3

Total
(2014-2018)

(669.9)

926.1

1,453.3

2,379.4

1,709.5

Total
(2009-2018)

192.7

1,297.8

2,189.1

3,486.9

3,679.6

19
See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds:
A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 72
(2008) (“ETF sponsors index their funds to benchmarks . . . so that investors in an ETF can
confirm that the price of the fund’s shares at any given moment fairly equals the price of all
the underlying securities in the fund’s portfolio.”).
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The Concentration of the Index Funds Sector

Finally, we wish to discuss the heavy concentration of the growing index
funds sector in the hands of three major investment managers. As we explain
below, there are three structural factors that have contributed to the dominance
of a small number of players. Most importantly, these factors are likely to enable
these players to retain their dominance over time.
Economies of Scale. The first factor is the significant economies of scale
inherent in operating a fund tracking an index. An ETF with assets of $10 billion
would have one hundred times the assets under management of an ETF with
assets of $100 million tracking the same index, but the costs of operating the
former would likely be much less than one hundred times the cost of operating
the latter. These economies of scale provide the operator of the $10 billion ETF
with a structural advantage over the operator of the $100 million ETF: the former
can charge investors a much smaller expense ratio to cover costs.20 In a recent
paper Professors John Adams, Darren Hayunga, and Sattar Mansi provide
empirical evidence of significant economies of scale in index fund
performance.21 The authors explain that this is partly due to there being some
elements of fixed costs for investment funds that can be divided over a larger
asset base in the case of large funds, including administration, broker trading
commissions, management, and marketing.22
ETF Assets and Liquidity. There is another related factor that arises with
respect to ETFs, which represent a growing segment of the index funds sector.
An ETF with more assets has a substantial advantage over an ETF tracking the
same index with fewer assets, not only because the larger ETF has lower
operational costs as a percentage of assets (as described above), but also because
the larger ETF offers beneficial investors significant liquidity advantages.
Investors considering ETF investments will consider not only the fees charged
by the investment manager but also the bid-ask spreads that the investor will
face when they acquire and dispose of their investment in the ETF. An ETF with
fewer assets can be expected to have lower liquidity and more significant bidask spreads than a larger ETF, which will operate to reduce the total return the
investor will enjoy from holding the ETF. Accordingly, index fund managers
that have enjoyed a first-mover advantage and that currently manage ETFs with
larger volumes of assets can offer investors liquidity benefits that index fund
managers operating ETFs tracking the same index but with fewer assets simply
cannot emulate. The liquidity advantages of ETFs that already have abundant
assets under management can be viewed as a source of network benefits, and
20

See, e.g., Bogle, supra note 6 (identifying diminished expense ratios as one reason few
new index funds try to compete).
21
John Adams, Darren Hayunga & Sattar Mansi, Returns to Scale in Active and Passive
Management 27 (Dec. 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=32957
99.
22
Id. at 26.
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such benefits have long been viewed as benefitting and protecting incumbent
firms.23
Table 2, below, reports the assets under management of the fifty largest equity
ETFs.24 These ETFs manage together more than $1.8 trillion, with the largest
ETF—the SPDR S&P 500 ETF—holding more than a quarter of a trillion
dollars. The fifty largest ETFs are dominated by BlackRock, Vanguard, and
SSGA, which manage twenty, sixteen, and nine of the fifty largest ETFs,
respectively. Only five of the fifty largest ETFs (and only one of the largest thirty
ETFs) are managed by managers other than the Big Three.25 Indeed, managers
other than the Big Three manage less than 7% of the assets held in the largest
fifty ETFs.26
Table 2. Fifty Largest ETFs by Assets Under Management (“AUM”).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
23

Exchange Traded Fund
SPDR S&P 500 ETF
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF
Vanguard S&P 500 ETF
Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF
Vanguard FTSE Developed Markets ETF
Invesco QQQ
iShares MSCI EAFE ETF
Vanguard FTSE Emerging Markets ETF
iShares Core MSCI EAFE ETF
iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets ETF
iShares Core S&P Mid-Cap ETF
Vanguard Value ETF
iShares Russell 2000 ETF
iShares Russell 1000 Growth ETF
iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF
iShares Russell 1000 Value ETF
Vanguard Growth ETF
Vanguard Real Estate Index Fund
Vanguard Dividend Appreciation ETF
iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF
Financial Select Sector SPDR Fund

AUM ($bn)
$251.48
$155.17
$99.00
$99.00
$66.34
$65.72
$63.77
$55.89
$53.81
$49.67
$44.93
$43.03
$42.96
$40.42
$40.38
$38.62
$34.36
$30.85
$30.37
$29.69
$25.68

Manager
SSGA
BlackRock
Vanguard
Vanguard
Vanguard
Non-Big 3
BlackRock
Vanguard
BlackRock
BlackRock
BlackRock
Vanguard
BlackRock
BlackRock
BlackRock
BlackRock
Vanguard
Vanguard
Vanguard
BlackRock
SSGA

See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An
Introduction, in THE NEW ECONOMY & BEYOND: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE 96, 104 (Dennis
W. Jansen ed., 2006).
24
Data for Table 2 is taken from the ETF Database. Largest ETFs: Top 100 ETFs by
Assets, ETFDB.COM, https://etfdb.com/compare/market-cap/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
25
Three of the five non-Big Three ETFs are managed by Charles Schwab and two are
managed by Invesco. See infra Table 2.
26
The total assets under management for the fifty largest equity ETFs as listed in Table 2
is $1,851 billion. The total assets under management of the five non-Big Three ETFs in the
fifty largest ETFs is $122 billion, or 6.6% of the total assets under management in the fifty
largest ETFs.

2019]
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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Vanguard Mid-Cap Index ETF
Vanguard Small Cap ETF
Vanguard High Dividend Yield ETF
Vanguard FTSE All-World ex-US ETF
SPDR Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF
iShares S&P 500 Growth ETF
Health Care Select Sector SPDR Fund
Vanguard Information Technology ETF
iShares Edge MSCI Min Vol USA ETF
Technology Select Sector SPDR Fund
SPDR S&P MidCap 400 ETF
iShares Russell 1000 ETF
iShares Select Dividend ETF
iShares Russell Midcap ETF
SPDR S&P Dividend ETF
iShares MSCI Japan ETF
iShares Core S&P Total U.S. Stock Market
ETF
Schwab International Equity ETF
iShares S&P 500 Value ETF
iShares J.P. Morgan USD Emerging Markets
Bond ETF
Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund
iShares U.S. Preferred Stock ETF
Invesco S&P 500® Equal Weight ETF
Schwab U.S. Large-Cap ETF
Vanguard FTSE Europe ETF
Consumer Discretionary Select Sector SPDR
Fund
Vanguard Large Cap ETF
Schwab U.S. Broad Market ETF
Vanguard Small Cap Value ETF
Total

731

$22.45
$22.18
$22.07
$21.21
$21.13
$20.91
$19.66
$19.10
$18.96
$18.72
$18.06
$17.24
$17.10
$17.02
$16.10
$15.86

Vanguard
Vanguard
Vanguard
Vanguard
SSGA
BlackRock
SSGA
Vanguard
BlackRock
SSGA
SSGA
BlackRock
BlackRock
BlackRock
SSGA
BlackRock

$15.71
$15.02
$15.00

BlackRock
Non-Big 3
BlackRock

$14.99
$14.69
$14.21
$14.20
$14.12
$13.68

BlackRock
SSGA
BlackRock
Non-Big 3
Non-Big 3
Vanguard

$12.99
$12.65
$12.59
$12.39
$1,851.17

SSGA
Vanguard
Non-Big 3
Vanguard

Difficulty of Disruption. Finally, a factor relevant for assessing the persistence
of market concentration is the ease with which rivals are able to unseat dominant
incumbents. In some markets incumbent market leaders face significant risks of
losing their dominance if a rival develops a disruptive product that customers
prefer and that the incumbent is not able to replicate quickly. However, the
nature of index fund offerings is such that, if investors show interest in an
indexed product that is not currently offered by the Big Three, the Big Three can
swiftly offer a very similar competing product. This ability of the dominant
players to quickly replicate any product in which investors show an interest
contributes to protecting the continued dominance of the existing major players.
II.

THE NUMBERS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

This Part provides empirical evidence about the steady rise of the Big Three
over the past two decades, as well as their major presence in corporate ownership
and voting, and estimates their future growth based on extrapolation from
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current trends. Section II.A provides evidence about past growth and the present
importance of Big Three shareholders. Section II.B extrapolates from these past
trends to predict the growth of the Giant Three.
A.

The Past and Present: The Rise of the Big Three

As discussed in Part I, there has been tremendous inflows of assets to index
funds over the past decade. Consistent with our analysis of the factors
contributing to the heavy concentration of the index fund sector, the great
majority of these inflows have gone to the Big Three.
Table 3 reports the asset flows to each of the Big Three from 2009 to 2018.27
The total inflows to the Big Three from 2009 to 2018 were more than $3 trillion,
and represent 82% of the inflows to all active and passive funds over that period.
The dominance of the Big Three as the destination for fund inflows was naturally
reflected in the growth of the Big Three during this period.
Table 3. Asset Flows to Big Three Mutual Funds and ETFs.
BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

Total Big
3

% of
Inflow to
All Funds

2009

77.2

97.2

11

185.3

41.3%

2010

(11.9)

80.6

31.4

100.1

23.4%

2011

28.4

81.1

17.2

126.6

61.1%

2012

76.1

142.5

44.2

262.7

60.8%

2013

60.4

138.7

18.3

217.2

47.8%

Total
(2009-2013)

230.2

539.8

121.9

891.9

45.3%

2014

113.2

216.3

41.1

370.4

80.5%

2015

108.7

236.1

(12.1)

332.7

141.8%

2016

88.5

304.8

48.3

441.5

402.0%

2017

256.7

361.1

32.9

650.7

102.1%

2018

112.3

218.7

12.9

343.9

128.6%

Total
(2014-2018)

679.3

1,336.9

123.1

2,139.2

125.1%

Total
(2009-2018)

909.5

1,876.7

244.9

3,031.1

82.4%

Table 3 demonstrates that the move to index funds appears to have
accelerated. During the five years from 2009 to 2013, the Big Three attracted
27
Table 3 is based on asset flow data from Morningstar Direct accessed on December 20,
2018. The 2018 figures include data through November 2018.
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$892 billion of assets, which was 45% of the total asset inflows to investment
funds during that period. Therefore, during this period the Big Three attracted
close to the same amount of assets as all other investment managers combined.
This necessarily represented a higher rate of growth for the Big Three than for
other fund managers, as the Big Three started the decade with fewer assets under
management. And, in the subsequent five years, from 2014 to 2018, the Big
Three had $2,139 billion in inflows, more than twice as much as the preceding
five years, representing 125% of total investment fund inflows.
Figure 1, below, shows the average percentage of the shares large public
corporations held by the Big Three for each year over the last two decades—a
percentage that has been increasing consistently and at a significant rate.28 It
shows that the growth in the proportion of the U.S. equity markets managed by
the Big Three has been dramatic. Panel 1 shows that the proportion of S&P 500
shares managed by the Big Three has grown approximately fourfold over the
past two decades, from 5.2% in 1998, to 20.5% in 2017. Furthermore, Panel 2
shows that for Russell 3000 companies, the proportion of assets the Big Three
holds has grown more than fourfold over the past two decades, from 3.7% in
1998 to 16.5% in 2017, though it still remains below the proportion that the Big
Three hold in S&P 500 companies.

28

Figure 1 is based on institutional ownership from the FactSet Ownership database by
FactSet Research Systems accessed on July 10, 2018, together with S&P 500 constituent data
from the Compustat database by S&P Global accessed on February 14, 2017, and Russell
3000 constituent data from FTSE Russell accessed on May 29, 2018.
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Figure 1. Percentage of Corporate Equity Held by Big Three Index Funds.
Panel 1: S&P 500 Companies
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Panel 2: Russell 3000 Companies
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Another way to provide a picture of the consistent and dramatic growth of the
Big Three is to consider the number of companies at which the Big Three hold
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positions of 5% or more. We therefore gather data from the FactSet Ownership
database regarding the size of the positions that each of the Big Three hold in
each S&P 500 and Russell 3000 company over the last ten years. Table 4 shows
the number of positions of 5% or more that each of the Big Three held in S&P
500 and Russell 3000 companies, and the total number of such positions across
the Big Three, in each of the years in 2007, 2012, and 2017.
Consistent with the results presented earlier, Table 4 displays a spectacular
growth in the number of positions of 5% or more held by the Big Three. Whereas
Vanguard held only fifteen such positions in S&P 500 companies in 2007, by
2017 Vanguard held such positions in essentially all of the S&P 500, an increase
of more than thirty times. Furthermore, the number of positions of 5% or more
in S&P 500 companies held by BlackRock and SSGA each tripled over the same
period, from 165 to 488 (almost the entire S&P 500) for BlackRock, and from
41 to 130 for SSGA. The total number of S&P 500 positions of 5% or more held
by the Big Three has increased more than fivefold, from 221 in 2007 to 1,118 in
2017. Panel 2 shows similar growth for the Russell 3000: the total number of
positions of 5% or more held by the Big Three has increased more than threefold
over the last decade, from 1,481 to 4,608 in 2017.
Table 4. Number of Positions of 5% or More Held by the Big Three.

Year
2007
2012
2017

Panel 1: S&P 500 Companies
BlackRock
Vanguard
SSGA
165
15
41
328
193
103
488
500
130

Combined
221
624
1,118

Year
2007
2012
2017

Panel 2: Russell 3000 Companies
BlackRock
Vanguard
SSGA
1,267
131
83
1,967
1,251
169
2,344
2,059
205

Combined
1,481
3,387
4,608

The data that we have presented to describe the phenomenal growth of the
Big Three over the past two decades also contains information about the major
role that the Big Three currently play in the ownership of public companies. As
Figure 1 shows, as of 2017 the Big Three held an average combined stake
exceeding 20% of S&P 500 companies and 16.5% of Russell 3000 companies.
Furthermore, as of 2017, practically all S&P 500 companies, and over two-thirds
of Russell 3000 companies, had two positions of 5% or more held by two of the
Big Three, and many such companies had positions of 5% or more held by each
of the Big Three.
Furthermore, the above figures significantly underestimate the voting power
of the Big Three and the extent to which their voting influences election
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outcomes. This is because index fund managers invariably vote in corporate
elections, while some other holders—especially retail investors—do so to a
much lesser extent.29 To provide a sense of the effects of such nonvoting on the
significance of Big Three holdings, Table 5 contrasts (1) the fraction of shares
owned in companies in the S&P 500 and Russell 3000 indexes by each of the
Big Three, and (2) the fraction of the votes of companies in those indexes cast
at annual meetings held by each of the Big Three.30
Table 5. Big Three Ownership of U.S. Companies
% of Outstanding Shares

S&P 500

Russell 3000

% of Votes Cast

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

BlackRock

7.1%

6.9%

8.7%

8.5%

Vanguard

8.8%

8.2%

11.1%

10.1%

SSGA

4.6%

4.4%

5.6%

5.5%

Big Three Total

20.5%

19.5%

25.4%

24.2%

BlackRock

7.3%

6.8%

10.1%

9.2%

Vanguard

6.6%

6.9%

8.6%

8.7%

SSGA

2.6%

2.4%

3.4%

3.0%

Big Three Total

16.5%

16.1%

22.0%

20.9%

As Table 5 indicates, the average share of the votes cast at S&P 500
companies at the end of 2017 was 8.7% for BlackRock, 11.1% for Vanguard,
and 5.6% for SSGA. These proportions are about 15% higher than the proportion
of outstanding shares managed by each of those managers. As a result, for S&P
500 companies, the proportion of the total votes that were cast by the Big Three
was about 25.4% on average, significantly higher than their combined
ownership stake of about 20.5% on average. Similarly, for Russell 3000
companies, the proportion of the total votes that were cast by the Big Three was
29
In the 2017 proxy season, only 29% of shares owned by retail investors were voted. See
BROADRIDGE & PWC, PROXYPULSE: 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 2 (2017), https://www.broa
dridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-2017-proxy-season-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ7HJJ77].
30
Table 5 is based on market capitalization data from Compustat accessed on February
14, 2017, institutional ownership data from FactSet Ownership accessed on July 10, 2018,
and director election data from FactSet Research Systems’ SharkRepellent database accessed
on June 18, 2018. “Votes cast” refers to the average sum, across all directors up for election,
of the votes cast for and against, and abstentions for that director at that corporation’s 2017
annual meeting.
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22% on average, also significantly greater than the 16.5% of outstanding Russell
3000 shares managed by the Big Three. Thus, ownership figures by themselves
significantly understate the effect that the Big Three have on voting outcomes.
B.

The Future: The Specter of the Giant Three

We agree with the adage that it is difficult to make predictions, especially
about the future. Still, given the steady rise of the ownership stakes of the Big
Three over the past two decades, it is natural for policymakers, researchers, and
market participants to ask what would be the result of a continuation of past
trends in the growth of the Big Three. This Section provides such estimates
based on the evidence regarding recent trends.
To generate such an estimate we begin by estimating the rate at which equity
ownership by investors other than the Big Three has declined over the past ten
years. In 2008, 13.5% of S&P 500 equity was managed by the Big Three, so
86.5% was not. Ten years later, in 2017, 20.5% of S&P 500 equity was managed
by the Big Three, so 79.5% was not. We calculate that the decline from 86.5%
to 79.5% over ten years reflected an annual rate of decline of 0.84%. We then
ask what would happen if the ownership of shares by non-Big Three investors
(which we refer to as “non-Big-Three holdings”) continues to decline at this
annual rate.31
Panel 1 of Figure 2 shows that if the recent rate of decline of non-Big-Three
holdings continues at the same rate as in the past decade, the combined average
ownership stake of the Big Three will rise to 27.6% in ten years, and to 33.4%
of S&P 500 equity in twenty years. Similar figures hold for the Russell 3000:
our estimation indicates that the average combined stake of the Big Three would
rise to 23.9% for the equity of Russell 3000 companies in 2028, and to 30.1% of
Russell 3000 companies in 2038.

31

This rate is calculated as 10√(c2008/c2017), where c2008 represents the average percentage
of shares of the index not managed by the Big Three in 2008 and c2017 represents the average
percentage of shares of the index not managed by the Big Three in 2017.
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Figure 2. Big Three Combined Stake—Future Growth Estimated from Past
Trend.
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Of course, whereas we use the past ten years to derive an estimate of the rate
of decline of non-Big-Three holdings, one could do so based on somewhat
different periods. To examine the consequences of using such different periods,
we recalculate the rate of decline of non-Big-Three holdings during the past five
years, from 2013 to 2017. We obtain a calculated rate of decline of 1.05%,
exceeding the 0.84% decline used above.
As we explained in Section III.A, the voting power of index funds is even
greater than would be suggested by the proportion of shares that they manage,
because many other shareholders do not vote. We therefore also estimate the
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future voting power of index funds. We first calculate the proportion of nonBig-Three holdings that did not vote for the election of directors in each of the
years from 2008 to 2017. We assume that the Big Three voted all of the shares
that they managed in all of those years. This is a reasonable assumption, as
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) guidance has indicated that U.S.
investment managers like the Big Three have a fiduciary duty to vote their
shares.32 Based on this assumption, the proportion of shares not managed by the
Big Three that voted in director elections varied from 85% in 2008 to 68% in
2017. The average proportion of non-Big-Three holdings voted at director
elections over that period was 73%. We assume that this proportion will remain
constant, and use it to estimate the voting power of the Big Three in the future.
Figure 3 shows our estimates of the voting power of the Big Three for the
next twenty years, for the S&P 500 (Panel 1) and for the Russell 3000 (Panel 2).
Panel 1 of Figure 3 shows that if the proportion of non-Big-Three holdings
that are voted remains the same, then the Big Three will control 34.3% of S&P
500 votes in ten years, and 40.8% of S&P 500 votes in twenty years. Panel 2
shows similar results for the Russell 3000: 29.8% of Russell 3000 votes in 2028
and 36.7% of Russell 3000 votes in 2038.

32

See Interpretive Bulletin on Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of
Investment Policy, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01 (2018) (“The fiduciary act of managing plan
assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those
shares of stock.”).
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Figure 3. Expected Future Growth—Big Three Combined Voting Stake.
Panel 1: S&P 500 Companies
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The estimates we obtained above are based on the rate of change in the past
ten years. We also derive estimates using shorter and longer periods—
specifically, the past five years and the past twenty years. Using these estimates
would result in estimates of the future voting power of the Big Three
commensurate to the estimate we generated above. In particular, extrapolating
from Big Three growth over the past five years would result in the estimated
average percentage of votes cast by the Big Three in S&P 500 companies
growing to 28.4% by 2028 and 35.6% by 2038. Similarly, extrapolating from
Big Three growth over the past twenty years would result in the average
percentage of votes cast by the Big Three in S&P 500 companies to grow to
27.2% by 2028 and 33.3% by 2038.
*****
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We reiterate our caution that accurately estimating the future growth of the
Big Three is difficult, and actual outcomes might differ from those we have
estimated above. The pace of Big Three growth over the next two decades could
at some point accelerate (say, due to a tipping point being reached whereby most
investors come to accept the logic of passive investing) or decelerate (say, due
to remaining investors in active funds being especially resistant to this logic).
However, the shift from active to index investments is expected to continue, and
there are strong reasons to expect the Big Three will continue to dominate index
investing. Furthermore, in evaluating where these developments can be expected
to lead, recent trends provide the most relevant evidence and provide a useful
basis for estimating future growth.
CONCLUSION
This Article has empirically examined the continuing steady growth of the
Big Three and what it is likely to mean for our corporate governance system.
We have analyzed the three drivers of the rise of the Big Three, including the
structural factors that lead to the heavy concentration of the index funds sector.
And we have documented the rise of the Big Three over the past decade and
their large footprint in current ownership of public companies and in corporate
voting.
Extrapolating from past trends, we have demonstrated the plausibility that the
Big Three will grow into the Giant Three over the next two decades. In this Giant
Three scenario the Big Three would dominate voting in most U.S. public
companies, casting as much as 40% of the votes in S&P 500 companies on
average. The clear message for policymakers from this analysis is that the Giant
Three scenario, and the challenges it poses for the corporate governance
landscape, should be taken seriously.
In particular, we wish to highlight one concern raised by the prospect of the
Giant Three scenario. As we analyzed and documented in earlier work on index
fund stewardship, the stewardship decisions of index funds in general, and the
Big Three in particular, are afflicted by agency problems.33 Of special concern
with respect to the Giant Three scenario are the deference incentives that we
identified. The Big Three—and their future Giant Three counterparts—can be
expected to have substantial incentives to be excessively deferential to the
corporate managers of their portfolio companies. If the Big Three were to grow
into the Giant Three, these deference incentives would operate to weaken
beneficial constraints on corporate managers.
Taking the Giant Three scenario seriously thus reinforces the importance of
recognizing the agency problems of index fund managers. As our study of index
fund stewardship has argued, those agency problems deserve the close attention
of policymakers and market participants, and pose a key challenge for our
corporate governance system.

33

See generally Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 1; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1.

